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Abstract
We examine the eﬀects of trade liberalization on child work and school-
ing in Indonesia. Our estimation strategy identiﬁes geographical diﬀer-
ences in the eﬀects of trade policy through district and province level
exposure to reduction in import tariﬀ barriers. We use seven rounds
(1993 to 2002) of the Indonesian annual national household survey (Suse-
nas), and relate workforce participation and school enrolment of children
aged 10-15 to geographic variation in relative tariﬀ exposure. Our main
ﬁndings show that increased exposure to trade liberalization is associated
with a decrease in child work and an increase in enrolment among 10 to 15
year olds. The eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions are strongest for children from
low skill backgrounds and in rural areas. However, a dynamic analysis
suggests that these eﬀects reﬂect the long term beneﬁts of trade liberal-
ization, through economic growth and subsequent income eﬀects, while
frictions and negative adjustment eﬀects may occur in the short term.
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11 Introduction
The eﬀects of trade liberalization on work and schooling of children are widely
debated and public and political interest in the issue is high. From a theoretical
perspective the eﬀects of trade liberalization on children’s outcomes are a pri-
ori unclear (e.g., Ranjan 2001, Jafarey and Lahiri 2002) as trade liberalization
acts potentially through several channels, changing relative prices, real income
distribution, wages and net returns to education. The arising income and sub-
stitution eﬀects can both raise and reduce schooling and workforce participation
of children.
Nevertheless, empirical evidence on the issue is scarce. Cross-country studies
generally ﬁnd that trade liberalization did not lead to increases in child labour
on average (Cigno, Rosati and Guarcello 2002), and more open economies have
less child labour because they are richer (Edmonds and Pavcnik 2006). However,
empirical studies based on micro data and direct evidence from liberalization
experiences are required to identify the main channels at work. For Vietnam,
Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) ﬁnd that rice price increases due to a dismantling
of export quotas led to an overall decrease in child labour in the 1990s, especially
due to the relatively evenly distributed favorable income eﬀects. In contrast,
Edmonds, Pavcnik and Topalova (2007) ﬁnd that in rural India, districts that
have been more strongly exposed to trade liberalization have experienced smaller
increases in school enrolment on average, which they argue is primarily due to the
unfavorable income eﬀects to the poor and the relatively high costs of education
in these districts.
Recent studies ﬁnd empirical evidence that positive transitory income shocks
can have negative eﬀects on human capital accumulation of children. Temporary
relative price changes, in particular changes in the value of children’s time, can
bring about substitution eﬀects that may outweigh income eﬀects, at least in
2the short term. Kruger (2007) ﬁnds that positive coﬀee production value shocks
in Brazil are associated with increased agricultural child labour incidence and
decreased school attendance, in particular for the poor.
This study examines the trade liberalization experience of Indonesia in the
1990s, and relates child outcomes to district and province level exposure to re-
duction in import tariﬀ barriers. In preparation to and following its accession to
the WTO, Indonesia went through a major reduction in tariﬀ barriers: average
import tariﬀ lines decreased from around 19.4 percent in 1993 to 8.8 percent
in 2002. During that same period the workforce participation of children aged
10 and 15 years decreased while school enrolment steadily increased. Due to
Indonesia’s size and geographic variation in economic structure, the various dis-
tricts have been very diﬀerently aﬀected by trade liberalization, which oﬀers us
a valuable identiﬁcation strategy.
Our identiﬁcation strategy follows that of Edmonds et al. (2007), as we
combine geographic variation in sector composition of the economy and temporal
variation in tariﬀ lines by product category, yielding geographic variation in
(changes in) average exposure to trade liberalization over time. We deﬁne two
alternative measures of geographic exposure to trade liberalization, by weighting
tariﬀs on diﬀerent product categories by the shares these products take in the
regional (district level) structure of employment. In addition to this, the data
allows us to go beyond the ﬁxed eﬀects approach employed in earlier studies and
investigate the dynamic eﬀects of trade liberalization.
The analysis draws on a large variety of data sources. Indonesia’s annual na-
tional household survey (Susenas) provides information on the main activities
of children and their basic socio-economic characteristics. We use four rounds
of this repeated cross section data, spaced at 3–year intervals between 1993 and
2002. As the Susenas is representative at the district level, we apply our analysis
3both at the individual level using pooled repeated cross section data with district
ﬁxed eﬀects, and at the district level with pseudo panel data for 261 districts.
The data on economic structure of the districts comes from information on re-
gional GDP (GRDP) of the Central Bureau of Statistics in Indonesia (BPS),
while district-level employment shares are based on the national household sur-
vey (Susenas). Additional information on district characteristics is derived from
diﬀerent rounds of PODES, the Village Potential Census. Finally, information
on tariﬀ lines comes from the TRAINS database.
Our main ﬁndings show that stronger exposure to trade liberalization has
lead to a decrease in child labour among 10 to 15 year olds. The eﬀects are
strongest for the poor and children from low skill backgrounds. The eﬀects of
tariﬀ reductions diminish for children from high skill households. A matching
pattern is observed for schooling, as tariﬀ reductions are associated with higher
enrollment rates. However, the dynamic analysis suggests that these eﬀects
reﬂect the long term beneﬁts of trade liberalization, through economic growth
and subsequent income eﬀects, while frictions and negative adjustment eﬀects
may occur in the short term.
The next section of the paper will elaborate on the context of the tariﬀ
reductions in Indonesia, and the developments in child labour and education
for our study period. The third section presents the data and sets out the
identiﬁcation strategy. The results are then discussed in section 4 while section
5 concludes.
42 Trade liberalization and children in Indone-
sia
2.1 Trade liberalization in the 1990s
Trade liberalization in Indonesia took place over more than ﬁfteen years. From
the mid-1980s the former import substitution policy has been gradually replaced
by a less restrictive trade regime, tariﬀ lines have been reduced while at the same
time a slow tariﬁcation of non–tariﬀ barriers took place (Basri and Hill 2004).
This laid the ground to the next wave of trade liberalization in the mid–1990s,
with rising foreign ﬁrm ownership and increasing export and import penetra-
tion.1 Tariﬀ reductions were particularly strong in the 1990s, with Indonesian
trade liberalization policy in that decade being deﬁned by two major events: the
conclusion of the Uruguay round in 1994 and Indonesia’s commitment to multi-
lateral agreements on tariﬀ reductions, and the Asian economic crisis in 1998 and
the post-crisis recovery process. After the Uruguay round Indonesia committed
itself to reduce all of its bound tariﬀs to less than 40% within ten years. In May
1995 a large package of tariﬀ reductions has been announced which laid down
the schedule of major tariﬀ reductions till 2003, and implemented further com-
mitments of Indonesia to the Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (Fane 1999).
While the removal of speciﬁc NTBs was accompanied by a temporary rise in tar-
iﬀs (especially in the food manufacturing sector), this did not aﬀect the overall
declining trend in any major way.
Figure 1 shows the reduction in tariﬀ lines over time and the variation be-
tween industries. On average, nominal tariﬀs reduced from 17.2 percent in 1993
1 Arguably, cronyism and speciﬁc protection of a few industries with ties to the Soeharto–
family—especially chemicals, motor vehicles and steel—reduced the eﬀect of overall liberal-
ization. However, the largest part of the cronyism occurred in nontraded sectors and did not
further aﬀect protection of the traded sectors (Basri and Hill 2004, p.637).
5to 6.6 percent in 2002. In this period the strongest reductions occurred from
1993 to 1995 and during the post crisis period after 1999. Tariﬀ dispersion
decreased especially in the post–crisis period when reductions have been more
universal. While tariﬀs decreased across the board, we see diﬀerences in initial
levels and in the extent of decrease (see Figure 2). Manufacturing started with
relatively high tariﬀ barriers but also shows the strongest reductions. For ex-
ample, wood and furniture saw tariﬀs decline from 27.2 to 7.9 percent, textiles
form 24.9 to 8.1 percent and other manufacturing from 18.9 to 6.4 percent. The
average tariﬀs for agriculture were already much lower in 1993, at 11.5, and
which reduced to 3.0 percent.2
Existing studies on the eﬀects of Indonesian trade liberalization document
both an increased ﬁrm productivity (Amiti and Konings 2007, Arnold and
Smarzynska Javorcik 2005), and a relative improvement of working conditions
(Sitalaksmi, Ismalina, Fitrady and Robertson 2007) in manufacturing, while
the eﬀects on overall poverty diﬀer in the short and long run (Hertel, Ivanic,
Preckel and Cranﬁeld 2004). At the plant–level, Amiti and Konings (2007) ﬁnd
that trade liberalization aﬀected ﬁrms’ productivity through two main channels:
Falling tariﬀs on imported inputs fostered learning and raised both product qual-
ity and variety, while falling output protection increased the competitive pres-
sures. Comparing the two eﬀects they argue that gains from falling input tariﬀs
were considerably higher. Firm productivity has also been strongly aﬀected by
FDI ﬂows: ﬁrms with increasing foreign ownership experienced restructuring,
employment and wage growth as well as stronger linkages to export and import
markets (Arnold and Smarzynska Javorcik 2005).
At the same time, working conditions seem to have improved especially in
manufacturing: Based on individual employment data, Sitalaksmi et al. (2007)
2Figure 3 shows that tariﬀ reductions and tariﬀ levels are reasonably positively related;
all outliers showing signiﬁcant increases in tariﬀs are related to alcoholic beverages and soft
drinks that were subject to a major retariﬁcation of non-tariﬀ barriers.
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with rising relative wages in the textile and apparel sector. Additionally, work-
ing conditions, proxied by workers’ own assessment of their income, working
facilities, medical beneﬁts, safety considerations and transport opportunities,
improved over time in the expanding manufacturing industries as compared to
agriculture.
The overall eﬀects of trade liberalization on household poverty can be ex-
pected to diﬀer in the short and the long run. The microsimulation analysis
of Hertel et al. (2004) stratiﬁes Indonesian households according to their earn-
ings specialization in 1993 and shows that self-employed agricultural households
are the most likely losers of a multilateral trade liberalization in the short–run,
which is especially due to falling relative prices in agriculture. In the longer run
some former agricultural workers will be moving into the formal wage labor mar-
ket and the poverty headcount can be expected to fall for every earnings group.
A further decomposition of the poverty changes ﬁnds that trade reforms in other
countries lead to a reduction in poverty in Indonesia but that liberalization in
Indonesia’s protected manufacturing industries has an opposite eﬀect.3
2.2 Child work
Indonesia experienced a steady decline in child work in the thirty years before
the Indonesian economic crisis, but this decline stagnated with the onset of
the crisis (e.g., Suryahadi, Priyambada and Sumarto 2005). Nevertheless, child
work did not increase considerably in face of to the economic crisis (see e.g.,
Cameron 2001) which might be partly due to compositional eﬀects: during the
crisis children have been moving out of the formal wage employment sector into
3 Suryahadi (2001) documents a fast increase in the employment of skilled labor force
as well as a decline in wage inequality (faster wage growth for the unskilled) during trade
liberalization in Indonesia although he does not establish causality.
7other small-scaled activities (Manning 2000).
The decline in child work is portrayed in Figure 4, for boys and girls, and
by diﬀerent age groups. Child work is here deﬁned as any work activity that
contributes to household income. In 1993 almost 8.0 percent of boys age 10 to 12
had worked for income in the last week, but which had decreased to just under
2.3 percent in 2002. For boys age 13 to 15, work incidence halved over that
period, from 28.3 percent in 1993 to 14.8 percent in 2002. Similar patterns are
observed for girls, although girls tend to be less involved in income generating
activities. Child work decreased from 5.4 to 1.6 percent for girls age 10 to 12,
and from 22.1 to 10.0 percent for girls age 13 to 15. For the senior secondary
school age group there is also a considerable decline in work activities; from
53.0 to 41.8 percent for boys and from 40.7 to 30.2 percent for girls. There are
substantial gender diﬀerences in economic and domestic activities. Boys work
activities is predominantly related to household income earnings, while girls’
work activities consist of a relative large share of domestic work.
We ﬁnd a slight increase in child work in the post-crisis recovery period, after
2000. This increase occurred in all sectors and could reﬂect the belated eﬀects of
the economic crisis, as Indonesia recovered more slowly from the crisis than its
neighbours. While the crisis did not see initial increases in child work, household
smoothing strategies may not be sustainable for longer durations, which could
have increased pressure on households to draw upon child work as the adverse
eﬀects of the crisis prolonged.
Agriculture is the main sector for child work, and developments in this sector
are driving the overall trends, as shown in ﬁgure 5. In 1993 just over 75 percent
of child work in the age group 10 to 12 occurred in agriculture, while two in
three child workers aged 13 to 15 worked in agriculture. The dominance of the
agricultural sector in child work translates to a 79 and 69 percent share in the
8overall reduction in child work. However, the relative changes from 1993 to 2002
are remarkably constant across sectors.
The trends in child work vary greatly by location and education attainment
of the head of household (Table 1). Child work incidence is much higher in
rural areas compared to urban areas, but rural areas experienced the largest
decline, both in absolute and relative terms. Among boys in rural households
24.2 percent worked for income in 1993, among boys in urban areas 6.3 percent.
By 2002 rural child work had halved to 12.3 percent, while in urban areas it
had reduced by about a third, to 4.3 percent. For girls the decline in child work
incidence is even stronger, dropping from 17.2 to 7.3 percent in rural areas, and
from 7.0 to 3,9 percent in urban areas. Child work incidence decreases with the
level of education of the head of household. Boys living in households where the
head of household has not ﬁnished primary education, are almost 6 times more
likely to work than boys from households where the head of household holds a
degree higher than junior secondary school; for girls this ratio is about 3. For
all the levels of education we see child work incidence decreasing.
2.3 Schooling
Indonesia has shown strong improvements in education attainment over past
decades, reaching almost universal primary school enrolment already in the
mid 1980s (e.g., Jones and Hagul 2001, Lanjouw, Pradhan, Saadah, Sayed and
Sparrow 2002). Indonesia’s current 9 year basic education policy aims at achiev-
ing universal enrolment for children up to the age of 15; that is, up to junior
secondary school. But while junior secondary school enrolment has certainly im-
proved, the large drop out of around 30 percent in the transition from primary to
junior secondary (around 70 percent) remains a thorn in these ambitions. In par-
ticular striking are the relatively low transition rates among the poor. Amongst
9the poorest 20 percent of the population, almost half of the children that ﬁnish
primary school drop out at junior secondary level; this in stark contrast to the 12
percent drop out rate for the richest quintile (Paqueo and Sparrow 2006). Other
problems that are still cause for concern are delayed enrolment and relatively
high repetition rates.
The economic crisis did not lead to a large school dropout, as was initially
feared after a similar experience in the late 1980s, although the increase in enrol-
ment did stagnate in 1999. Households appeared to have employed alternative
short term smoothing strategies to protect the education of their children, in
particular children in secondary school as this is associated with relatively higher
sunk costs and future returns (Thomas, Beegle, Frankenberg, Sikoki, Strauss and
Teruel 2004). A second explanation can be found with the success of a social
safety net scholarship programme in preventing a decrease in primary enrolment
(Sparrow 2007).
Figure 6 shows the recent trend in enrolment by age group (irrespective of
enrolment level). Enrolment among primary school age children has been near
universal throughout the period 1993 to 2002. There is a strong increase in
enrolment for the 13 to 15 and the 16 to 18 year old, with a slight decrease in
the post crisis years. A striking feature for Indonesia is that, unlike for child
work, we see no gender gap.
The diﬀerential trends in enrolment by household characteristics and location
are shown in Table 2. While school enrolment is higher among children in urban
areas, it is the strong increase in the rural areas that has driven the national
trend during the 1990s. The enrolment rate in rural areas increased from just
below 80 percent in 1993 to just above 85 percent in 2002. In urban areas we see
little change in the male enrolment rate, but an increase for girls. Enrolment
of boys and girls age 10 to 15 year is universal for children from relatively
10high educated households. But for children in households where the head of
household did not ﬁnish primary schooling, enrolment generally remains below
80 percent. But similar to rural areas, it is the group with the lowest initial level
of enrolment where we see the largest relative and absolute gains from 1993 to
2002.
In the remainder of this analysis we focus on primary school age children
close to the transition point, age 10 to 12, and junior secondary school age
children, age 13 to 15. For children younger than 10 enrolment is universal and
information on work is not available.
Public spending on education decreased slightly in early 1990s, to 2.5 percent
in the pre-crisis year 1997. After the crisis this trend reversed. From 2000 to 2003
per capita public education spending increased by 49 percent, while education
spending as share of GDP increased to 3 percent in 2003 (World Bank 2006).
Nevertheless, public spending remains relatively low compared to countries in
the region. In South-East Asia only Bangladesh and Cambodia spend a smaller
share of GDP on education.
In general, public spending on education is targeted to the poor due to
relatively pro-poor enrolment in public primary schools. But there are large
diﬀerences between school levels. With low transition rates to secondary school
among the poor, beneﬁt incidence of public spending shows a neutral distribu-
tion for junior secondary school, and is targeted to the non-poor for secondary
school (Lanjouw et al. 2002, World Bank 2006).
The main barriers to education concern both demand and supply factors.
Paqueo and Sparrow (2006) ﬁnd that enrolment is sensitive to the level of school
fees, in particular for secondary education. However, indirect costs form even a
more formidable obstacle to enrolment, in the form of tuition fees, text books and
uniforms, and transport costs. Another deterrent for enrolment are opportunity
11cost of schooling, as increased wages for children in local labour markets appear
to reduce the probability of enrolment. Regarding the supply side factors, qual-
ity of education is a major source of concern in Indonesia. In particular teacher
quality and absenteeism, and lack of access to secondary schools, especially in
remote and rural areas (World Bank 2006).
2.4 Expected eﬀects of trade liberalization
Consider a household consisting of one child and one adult where the adult
maximizes a joint utility from consumption and schooling and allocates the
child’s time between work, and the normal goods schooling and leisure. The
child is seen here as a perfect (although potentially less productive) substitute
for unskilled adult labor (see e.g., Basu and Van 1998). Child work and schooling
will react in this context to changes in household income, in child wages, and
relative product prices.
Trade liberalization is generally reﬂected in changes in relative prices as they
come closer to world market prices. A reduction of import tariﬀs, which is the
focus of our analysis, alters relative prices and relative factor rewards in the
economy. After reducing import tariﬀs, imported and import–competing prod-
ucts become relatively less expensive, which will both aﬀect consumption and
production patterns. For consumers, these changes in relative prices lead to an
increase in real income as well as to an increase of opportunity costs of consump-
tion of the other goods (child schooling and leisure among them).4 Producers of
the import competing good who experience the relative price decrease experi-
ence losses and reduce their production. As a consequence, the relative demand
for the factors that are used more intensively in production decreases.
4 This eﬀect through the consumption channel we neglect for the moment, and plan to come
back to it in our subsequent work. As long as districts show relatively similar consumption
patterns, not controlling for the consumption channel will not bias our estimates.
12The net eﬀects of these changes on household income depend on the initial
consumption pattern and factor ownership of the household. Changing relative
factor rewards aﬀect not only household income but also the opportunity costs
of child schooling and leisure. In a dynamic context, they might also change the
expected net returns to skill acquisition. If relative wages of unskilled increase
(as documented for Indonesia by Suryahadi (2001)), this raises the net value
of the child’s time which might cet.par. raise child work and reduce schooling.
Thus, income and substitution eﬀects might act into opposite directions, and
the net eﬀect on child outcomes is an empirical question.
3 Data and empirical approach
3.1 Data
Indonesia’s national socio-economic household survey, Susenas, provides infor-
mation on the outcome variables and socio-economic characteristics for indi-
viduals and households. The Susenas is conducted annually around January-
February and typically consists of a nationally representative sample of ap-
proximately 200,000 households. Districts are deﬁned as municipalities (Kota)
or predominantly rural areas (Kabupaten). Each district (both the Kota and
Kabupaten) can be further divided into urban precincts (Kelurahan)a n dr u -
ral villages (Desa). The exception are the ﬁve districts comprising the capital
Jakarta, which are deﬁned as completely urban. It is at this district-urban/rural
divide at which the Susenas sample is stratiﬁed. Hence, the Susenas is repre-
sentative at the district level. In the analysis we will use the Desa/Kelurahan
deﬁnition to identify households as either urban or rural.
The outcome variables record whether a child has worked in the last week
and whether a child is enrolled in school. As mentioned earlier, market work is
13deﬁned as activities that directly generate household income, irrespectively of
whether it was perforemd at the formal labor market or within the family. We
distinguish it from domestic work which consists of household chores only. The
Susenas also provides us information on education attainment of other household
members, household composition and monthly household expenditure.
Information on tariﬀ lines comes from the TRAINS database. These reﬂect
the simple average of all applied tariﬀ rates, which tend to be substantially
lower than the bound tarrifs during the 1990s (WTO 1998, WTO 2003). As
data on tariﬀ lines is not available for some years (1994, 1997, and 1998), we use
information from four three–year intervals (1993, 1996, 1999, and 2002) both in
the pooled cross section and in the district panel. We can consistently match the
relevant product categories to sectoral employment data derived from Susenas
at the 1 digit level, of which the tradable sectors are agriculture, manufacturing
and mining/quarrying.
The number of districts in the sample is not constant over time. First, we
lose a number of districts due to missing data for some years. Districts in Aceh,
Maluku and Irian Jaya have not been included in the Susenas in some years
due to violent conﬂict situations at the time of the survey. In addition, the
13 districts in East Timor were no longer covered by Susenas after the 1999 for
referendum on independence. We therefore drop these regions from the analysis.
Another problem is that over the period 1993 to 2002 some districts have split
up over time. To keep time consistency in the district deﬁnitions, we redeﬁne
the districts to the 1993 parent district deﬁnitions.
Since the Susenas rounds are representative for the district population in
each year, we construct a district panel by pooling the four annually repeated
cross sections. In addition to the pooled data, we collapse the data to the
district level creating a district pseudo-panel. The advantage of pooling the
14cross-section data is that we can account for individual heterogeneity, both in
terms of characteristics and the impact of trade liberalization. For example, we
are interested in the diﬀerential impact for high and low skilled labour, urban
and rural areas, and gender. On the other hand, the pseudo-panel allows us to
investigate dynamic eﬀects.
Some descriptive statistics are given in Table 3. Pooling the four years of
Susenas data yields a sample of 458,406 observations for children age 10 to 15.
The top panel of the table shows the outcome variables and the individual and
household characteristics that we will use in the regressions. The bottom panel
shows the descriptive statistics for the diﬀerent tariﬀ measures after they have
been merged to the individual data. The variable Tariﬀ reﬂects a district’s
exposure to tariﬀ protection based on employment shares.
3.2 Regional tariﬀ exposure
Following Edmonds et al. (2007), tariﬀ exposure measures are constructed by
combining information on geographic variation in sector composition of the econ-
omy and temporal variation in tariﬀ lines by product category. This yields a
measure indicating how changes in exposure to tariﬀ reductions varies by geo-
graphic area over the period 1993 to 2002.
We deﬁne two alternative measures of economic structure at district level:
(i) sector share of GDP5 (ii) sector share of employment. These measures reﬂect
diﬀerent dimensions of households’ exposure to trade liberalization: the former
through the distributional eﬀects of local economic growth, the latter through
labour market dynamics.
For each sector (h) the annual national tariﬀ lines Tht for the relevant product
5To be added in the next version.























The evolution of tariﬀ protection, weighted by the GRDP and employment
shares, is shown in ﬁgure 7. Exposure is higher when the tariﬀ lines are weighted
by employment shares as compared to GRDP. This emphasizes the role of agri-
culture in terms of employment as compared to economic production.6
Figure 8 clearly shows a large degree of geographic variation in tariﬀ exposure
over time and location. The lines reﬂect the changes in tariﬀ exposure for each
province, grouped by main geographic area.
3.3 Identiﬁcation
3.3.1 Static analysis: pooled district panel
Identiﬁcation of the impact of tariﬀ reductions relies on the geographic panel
nature of the combined data, and in particular on the variation in tariﬀ exposure
over regions and over time. We include district ﬁxed eﬀects, δk, while time-
region ﬁxed eﬀects control for aggregate time trends, λrt, allowing these to
diﬀer by the ﬁve main geographic areas of the archipelago: the Islands of Java,
Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, and a cluster of smaller Islands consisting
of Bali and the Nusa Tenggara group. We also include a set of household and
6During the analyzed time–span, rice prices were administered, and the national trading
company (BULOG) had an import monopoly on rice. Export bans on rice were also eﬀective.
Hence, we exempt rice production from tradable agricultural good production, and reduce
the labor and GDP shares in tradable agriculture by the share of rice ﬁelds in agricultural
plantations within each district. We compute this latter information from the 1993 village
agricultural census (PODES).
16individual control variables, Xikt: age, gender and education of the household
head, household size, and whether a household resides in an urban or rural area.
The main speciﬁcation for the pooled district panel is
Pr(likt = 1) = Pr(α + βTkt + X
 
iktγ + λrt + δk +  ikt > 0) (3)
We estimate the model separately for boys and girls, by age group. The diﬀer-
ential impact of trade liberalization is further explored by interacting the tariﬀ
exposure measure with the education of the head of household, as proxy for high
or low skill labour, and a rural dummy variable.
3.3.2 Potential sources of bias
The main identifying assumption is that time variant shocks  ikt are orthogonal
to Tkt. This would seem a reasonable assumption, given that Tkt consists of
the baseline economic structure and national changes in tariﬀ regime. Thus,
any temporal or regional variation endogenous to child work activities would be
controlled for by time and geographic ﬁxed eﬀects. The identifying assumption
would be violated if changes in district tariﬀ exposure is endogenous to diﬀerent
local growth trajectories. Within the Indonesian context, regional variation in
growth trajectories may be partly determined by initial conditions regarding
sectoral composition, in particular agriculture.
A ﬁrst trend to note is that districts with a higher initial incidence of child
labour experience larger changes in child labour over time. This is reﬂected by
ﬁgure 9a, which depicts a strong correlation between child work incidence in
districts in 1993 and the decrease in child labour from 1993 to 2002. With the
bulk of child work located in agriculture, we would expect child work to decrease
faster in districts with a relatively large share of of the population active in
17agriculture and living in rural areas in 1993. These patterns are conﬁrmed by
ﬁgure 9b for the initial rural population share, 9c for the initial agricultural
labour force share and 9d for the the GRDP agriculture share.
Regional diversity in structural change and economic outcomes is a promi-
nent feature of Indonesia’s economic geography. In particular, a rapid shift out
of agriculture and increase in manufacturing and services. ? show evidence of
strong regional variation in economic growth and structural change since the
1970s. Structural change has been relatively slow in poor regions and provinces
with a relatively strong comparative advantage in agriculture. However, they
ﬁnd only weak positive correlation between economic growth and structural
change in districts. This is consistent with the patterns in our data, as we ﬁnd a
slight negative correlation between the 1993 share of agriculture in GRDP and
the change in real per capita GRDP from 1993 to 2002 (ﬁgure 10a).
A related initial conditions problem, discussed at length by Edmonds et al.
(2007), lies with the non-tradable sector, which is also an element in Tkt.D i s -
tricts may experience diﬀerent growth paths, depending on the size of the non-
tradable sector. Figure 10b shows weak negative correlation between changes
real GRDP per capita and the initial share of the non-tradable sector in GRDP.
However, we see contrasting patterns for initial labour and GRDP share of the
non-tradable sector. Figure 11 shows that child work decreased faster in dis-
tricts with relatively small share of the labour force engaged in the non-tradable
sector (ﬁgure 11b), but at the same time a large initial fraction of GRDP (ﬁgure
11b).
Since the initial sectoral composition of district economies are at the heart
of Tkt, such diﬀerential trends in child labour could confound our estimates.
183.3.3 Dynamic analysis: district pseudo-panel
Collapsing the pooled district panel to a district pseudo-panel provides more
options to further address the potential source of bias and allow a dynamic
analysis, at the cost of losing the individual variation in the data. The district
pseudo-panel analogue to (3) is
¯ lkt = α + βTkt + ¯ X
 
iktγ + λrt + δk +¯  kt (4)
where ¯ lkt is the fraction of children in district k that work in a given year t.
This speciﬁcation is still prone to the potential source of bias through time
variant unobservables. However, it provides a ﬁrst indicative test of strict exo-
g e n e i t yo ft a r i ﬀe x p o s u r e ,E{Tkt¯  ks} = 0 for all s and t. With the ﬁxed eﬀects
removed after a ﬁrst-diﬀerence transformation of (4), Tkt should add no extra
explanatory information under the assumption of strict exogeneity
Δ¯ lkt = βΔTkt + ϕTkt +Δ¯ X
 
iktγ + λrt +Δ ¯  kt (5)
which implies the testable hypothesis that ϕ =0 .
As suggested in Edmonds et al. (2007), the scope of bias related to initial
conditions can be investigated further by introducing initial sector shares as
control variables. We therefore add to equation (5) the 1993 labour and GDP
shares (for speciﬁcations with T L and T GDP, respectively) of the agriculture,
mining, manufacturing, construction, trade, and transport sectors (with utilities
as reference group), in addition to adult literacy rate in districts.
Finally, we exploit the pseudo-panel fully by taking a dynamic specifcation,
where we include a lagged dependent variable and lagged tariﬀ measure.
¯ lkt = βTkt + φTkt−1 + θ¯ lkt−1 + ¯ X
 
iktγ + λrt + δk +¯  kt (6)
19By including a lagged dependent variable we account for state dependence, and
potential confounding diﬀerential trends in child labour between relatively high
and low child labour districts. By investigating lagged eﬀects of tariﬀ changes
we can identify short and long term eﬀects. The immediate eﬀect of a percentage
point change in tariﬀ exposure is reﬂected by β. The total long term change in
¯ l as a result of a percentage point change in tariﬀ exposure, taking into account
lagged eﬀects of tariﬀ changes and its dynamic multiplier eﬀect trough ¯ lkt−1,i s
approximated by (β + φ)/(1 − θ).
Adding a lagged dependent variable to the model introduces a new source
of bias. We therefore adopt a GMM approach to resolve any bias from the
lagged dependent variable and potential endogeneity of tariﬀ exposure. We
apply an Arrelano-Bond diﬀerence GMM estimator, with a two-step Windmeijer
correction. System estimation is not suitable as this requires the identifying
assumption that the instruments are not correlated with the ﬁxed eﬀects. This
is a problematic assumption for our study as a main cause of concern lies with the
correlation of changes in child labour and tariﬀs with the initial characteristics of
districts. This is also reﬂected in the Sagan-Hansen overidentifying restrictions
tests results, which strongly reject the validity of the instruments in case of
system GMM, but not for diﬀerence GMM. We treat tariﬀ exposure and lagged
child work as endogenous, and adult literacy as pre-determined. First diﬀerences
of these variables are then instrumented with their lagged levels.
4 Results
The estimated eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions on work are given in Table 4. The basic
speciﬁcation (model A) indicates that a decrease in tariﬀ exposure is associated
with a decrease in child work for 10 to 15 year old children, but the size of the
eﬀect varies by gender and also depends on the nature of the exposure measure.
20A percentage point decrease in tariﬀ exposure leads to a 1.7 percentage point
decrease in work incidence of boys and 1.2 percentage point for girls. For our
period of analysis, the around 4.5 percentage point decrease in tariﬀ exposure
(c.f. Figure 7) is connected with about 7.7 percentage point decrease in boys’
work (out of the total decrease of 9.6 percentage points (Table 1)) and with
about 5.4 percentage point decrease in girls’ work (out of the total decrease of
8 percentage points (Table 1)).
Model B investigates diﬀerential eﬀects by skill level. The tariﬀ exposure
measure is interacted with the level of education of the head of household, de-
ﬁned as (i) not completed primary school, (ii) completed primary school, (iii)
completed secondary school and (iv) completed higher education. The beneﬁts
of tariﬀ reductions are relatively higher for low skill households.
Model C suggests that the bulk the eﬀect of trade liberalization lies with
rural areas. For tariﬀ-rural interaction term is close to the overall eﬀect, while
the baseline tariﬀ coeﬃcient (reﬂecting urban impact) is small and statistically
not signiﬁcant.
The eﬀects are presented separately for age groups age 10 to 12 and age
13 to 15. As expected, the eﬀects are larger for junior secondary school age
children compared to primary school age children. This reﬂects the transition
gap after primary education and diﬀerences in opportunity costs to schooling.
A percentage point decrease in tariﬀ exposure leads to a decrease in child work
of 1.1 (0.8) percentage points for boys (girls) age 10 to 12 and 2.5 (1.8) for boys
(girls) age 13 to 15. But the overall patterns are similar for both age groups:
both show that the marginal eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions diminish as the skill
level of households increases, and that the eﬀects are relatively stronger in rural
areas.
The eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions on school enrolment are presented in Table 5
21for the full sample and by age group. A percentage point decrease in exposure
to tariﬀ protection results to a 0.5 percentage point increase in enrolment for
boys, and 0.3 percentage point for girls aged 10 to 15.
We see diﬀerences by age group, as the marginal eﬀects are statistically sig-
niﬁcant only for the older children. For the 13 to 15 year age group, a percentage
point decrease in tariﬀ exposure is associated with an 1.0 percentage point in-
crease in enrolment for boys and 0.7 percentage point for girls. A 4.5 percentage
point decrease in tariﬀ exposure over the period of analysis would then be re-
sponsible for a 4.3 percentage point increase in enrolment for boys and 2.9 for
girls of junior secondary school age. The pattern of eﬀects on enrolment mirror
those of child work, but in terms of size of coeﬃcients the eﬀects seem small.
But this is due to the relatively high enrolment rates in Indonesia. Compared
to non-enrolment, the eﬀects are sizable. For example, between 1993 and 2002,
non-enrolment among the 13 to 15 year age group decreased by 28 percent for
boys and 35 percent for girls (translating to 0.8 and 1.1 percentage points, re-
spectively). About half of this eﬀect for boys and one quarter of the eﬀect for
girls can be attributed to tariﬀ changes.
The beneﬁts of trade liberalization for human capital accumulation are rela-
tively higher for 13 to 15 year old children from low skill households and, similar
to the child work results, mainly concentrated in rural areas. For 10 to 12 year
olds the marginal beneﬁts are more evenly distributed.
Tables ?? and 7 present the estimates for the district level pseudo–panel
where the dependent variables are the share of children (aged 10–15) working or
being enrolled in school in a given district/year cell. The results are consistent
with the pooled cross section results. The tables report results for both random
and ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations. As expected, a ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation dimin-
ishes the size of the coeﬃcients. The size of the impact estimates are further
22reduced as control variables are included. Nevertheless, they remain precise and
within range of the pooled cross section results. Tables ?? and 7 also report
estimates for sub-samples, by level of schooling of the head of household. These
estimates also show patterns similar to the pooled cross section.
The ﬁxed eﬀect approach is vulnerable to time-invariant unobservables. One
potential confounding factor in the Indonesian context could be the development
in rural areas, in particular households moving out of agriculture. We therefore
include a variable indicating the changes in the share of district population living
in rural areas. If our estimates indeed confound the eﬀects of trade liberalization
and reduction of the agricultural population, then the results should be sensitive
to including the rural population share variable. However, we ﬁnd that the tariﬀ
coeﬃcient is robust to including this variable, even though the rural population
share coeﬃcient is relatively large and statistically signiﬁcant. This suggest
that the move out of agriculture observed in the 1990s is an important factor
driving changes in schooling and child work, but is not confounding the impact
estimates of tariﬀ changes.
Simple inclusion of the lagged tariﬀ variable in column (4) indicates that im-
mediate and longer–term eﬀects of trade liberalization might diﬀer, in particular
for schooling. Including a lagged tarrif term eliminates the immediate eﬀect on
schooling, suggesting that all the eﬀect comes from lagged changes. In fact, the
coeﬃcients suggest that the model without lags seems to pick up the net result
of an initial negative eﬀect on schooling, which is outweighed in the long term
by a positive eﬀect. However, the standard error for the initial eﬀect is too large
to conﬁrm this. For child work the results are not sensitive to including lagged
tariﬀs.
235 Conclusion
This paper examined the eﬀects of trade liberalization on child work and school-
ing in Indonesia. In the 1990s, Indonesia went through a major reduction in tariﬀ
barriers, with average import tariﬀ lines decreased from around 19.4 percent in
1993 to 8.8 percent in 2002. A period which also saw reductions in child work
increased school enrolment.
We identify the eﬀects of trade liberalization by combining geographic vari-
ation in sector composition of the economy with temporal variation in tariﬀ
lines by product category. This yields geographic variation in changes in av-
erage exposure to trade liberalization over time, hence identifying geographical
diﬀerences in the eﬀects of trade policy.
Our main ﬁndings suggest that Indonesia’s trade liberalization experience in
the 1990s has lead to an increase in human capital investments, mainly through
increased economic growth and reduced poverty. Increased exposure to trade
liberalization is associated with a decrease in child work and an increase in
enrolment among 10 to 15 year old children. The eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions
increase with the age of children, and are strongest for children from low skill
backgrounds and in rural areas. Through these human capital investments,
trade liberalization will have long term welfare implications, in particular for
low skill, and presumably poorer, households.
Extensions to this paper will (i) introduce alternative measures of tariﬀ ex-
possure, based on district GDP by sector, (ii) probe deeper into the endogenous
relationship between district tariﬀ exposure and human capital investments, by
fully exploiting the posibility of the district pseudo-panel, (iii) investigate the
main transmission channels of the eﬀects of trade liberalization, both in the
short and long term, and (iv) elaborate on the distributional eﬀects of Indone-
24sia’s trade policy.
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28A Tables
Table 1: Evolution of market work of children over time
Share of boys aged 10–15 doing market work
By head’s educational attainment By location
Year None Primary Low sec. Higher Urban Rural Total N
1993 0.264 0.172 0.097 0.045 0.063 0.242 0.187 63,009
1994 0.254 0.157 0.090 0.046 0.060 0.224 0.172 63,556
1995 0.256 0.156 0.089 0.043 0.066 0.227 0.175 59,992
1996 0.221 0.142 0.087 0.042 0.059 0.195 0.153 61,234
1997 0.197 0.120 0.066 0.035 0.045 0.169 0.128 58,487
1998 0.217 0.137 0.093 0.039 0.059 0.187 0.144 56,783
1999 0.206 0.131 0.083 0.042 0.054 0.175 0.139 54,907
2000 0.174 0.110 0.065 0.031 0.039 0.154 0.112 51,003
2001 0.196 0.123 0.088 0.042 0.055 0.169 0.127 54,156
2002 0.155 0.091 0.060 0.027 0.043 0.123 0.091 53,694
N 222,837 191,241 67,801 99,714 193,511 388,082 581,593
Share of girls aged 10–15 doing market work
By head’s educational attainment By location
Year None Primary Low sec. Higher Urban Rural Total N
1993 0.190 0.121 0.085 0.066 0.070 0.172 0.139 59,895
1994 0.182 0.116 0.068 0.057 0.063 0.158 0.128 59,582
1995 0.167 0.112 0.077 0.061 0.066 0.152 0.124 57,102
1996 0.152 0.093 0.066 0.055 0.057 0.131 0.107 58,430
1997 0.121 0.076 0.053 0.044 0.042 0.106 0.084 55,427
1998 0.137 0.092 0.069 0.050 0.058 0.120 0.098 53,814
1999 0.132 0.080 0.059 0.048 0.049 0.109 0.091 51,936
2000 0.106 0.070 0.047 0.032 0.035 0.095 0.072 47,832
2001 0.121 0.075 0.068 0.045 0.049 0.104 0.083 50,926
2002 0.098 0.053 0.037 0.030 0.039 0.073 0.059 50,423
N 207,841 180,188 64,162 97,517 188,091 361,617 549,708
29Table 2: Evolution of school enrolment of children over time
Share of boys aged 10–15 enroled in school
By head’s educational attainment By location
Year None Primary Low sec. Higher Urban Rural Total N
1993 0.738 0.865 0.941 0.977 0.927 0.791 0.833 63,009
1994 0.750 0.872 0.951 0.976 0.935 0.806 0.847 63,556
1995 0.757 0.871 0.944 0.976 0.926 0.807 0.845 59,992
1996 0.768 0.876 0.944 0.977 0.928 0.822 0.855 61,234
1997 0.780 0.881 0.952 0.979 0.934 0.836 0.868 58,487
1998 0.773 0.873 0.940 0.980 0.930 0.829 0.863 56,783
1999 0.784 0.884 0.951 0.978 0.932 0.844 0.870 54,907
2000 0.789 0.886 0.957 0.977 0.929 0.848 0.878 51,003
2001 0.793 0.890 0.949 0.978 0.935 0.851 0.879 54,156
2002 0.785 0.882 0.946 0.978 0.933 0.851 0.881 53,694
N 222,837 191,241 67,801 99,714 193,511 388,082 518,593
Share of girls aged 10–15 enroled in school
By head’s educational attainment By location
Year None Primary Low sec. Higher Urban Rural Total N
1993 0.737 0.857 0.938 0.947 0.908 0.787 0.827 59,895
1994 0.747 0.866 0.949 0.948 0.914 0.805 0.841 59,582
1995 0.758 0.867 0.942 0.951 0.915 0.806 0.841 57,102
1996 0.765 0.877 0.947 0.956 0.921 0.821 0.853 58,430
1997 0.774 0.883 0.945 0.958 0.926 0.831 0.863 55,427
1998 0.779 0.879 0.940 0.958 0.925 0.849 0.864 53,814
1999 0.793 0.888 0.954 0.964 0.933 0.849 0.875 51,936
2000 0.804 0.892 0.958 0.969 0.933 0.855 0.884 47,832
2001 0.819 0.903 0.961 0.969 0.935 0.871 0.892 50,926
2002 0.797 0.888 0.953 0.969 0.935 0.857 0.887 50,423
N 207,841 180,188 64,162 97,517 188,091 361,617 549,708
30Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variables No. obs. Mean St.dev. Min. Max.
Market work 458406 0.123 0.328 0 1
School enrolment 458406 0.859 0.348 0 1
Household work 458406 0.028 0.166 0 1
Staying idle 458406 0.048 0.215 0 1
Female 458406 0.486 0.500 0 1
Age 458406 12.455 1.706 10 15
Female head 458406 0.081 0.272 0 1
Household size 458406 5.727 1.815 1 22
Rural 458406 0.668 0.471 0 1
Head’s ed.: none 458406 0.381 0.486 0 1
Head’s ed.: primary 458406 0.328 0.470 0 1
Head’s ed.: secondary 458406 0.117 0.321 0 1
Head’s ed.: higher 458406 0.174 0.379 0 1
Year 1997.3 3.365 1993 2002
Tariff measures:
Tariﬀ 458406 5.416 3.086 0.176 14.900
Tariﬀ in agriculture 458406 4.309 3.235 0.000 13.668
Tariﬀ in mining 458406 0.055 0.078 0.000 1.090
Tariﬀ in manufacturing 458406 1.052 0.932 0.023 6.744
31Table 4: Pooled results on child work and tariﬀ protection
Market work of children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Aged 10–15 Aged 10–12 Aged 13–15
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
Model A
Tariﬀ 0.0170** 0.0122** 0.0112** 0.0078** 0.0247** 0.0179**
(0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0027) (0.0024)
Adj. R2 0.156 0.108 0.067 0.053 0.152 0.095
Model B
Tariﬀ × 0.0179** 0.0131** 0.0120** 0.0087** 0.0257** 0.0188**
Head’s ed.: none (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0026)
Tariﬀ × 0.0155** 0.0107** 0.0098** 0.0063** 0.0229** 0.0166**
Head’s ed.: primary (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0027) (0.0025)
Tariﬀ × 0.0103** 0.0082** 0.0062** 0.0057** 0.0157** 0.0115**
Head’s ed.: secondary (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Tariﬀ × 0.0041* 0.0031* 0.0027† 0.0039** 0.0067** 0.0031
Head’s ed.: higher (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0027)
Adj. R2 0.157 0.108 0.069 0.054 0.154 0.097
Model C
Tariﬀ 0.0010 0.0020 0.0005 0.0021† 0.0016 0.0021
(0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0028) (0.0027)
Tariﬀ × 0.0137** 0.0087** 0.0091** 0.0048** 0.0197** 0.0137**
Rural (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0017)
Adj. R2 0.157 0.108 0.069 0.054 0.154 0.096
In all models:
District ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region×year interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr. obs. 235,393 223,013 122,834 114,731 112,559 108,282
Nr. districts 261 261 261 261 261 261
Notes: All models were estimated by OLS, weighted by sampling weights. Further
controls include age dummies, household size, and dummies on heads’ education, female
head, and rural. Robust standard errors (clustered at district level) are reported in
parentheses. *,**,† denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
32Table 5: Pooled results on child schooling and tariﬀ protection
School enrolment of children
Sample Aged 10–15 Aged 10–12 Aged 13–15
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
Model A
Tariﬀ -0.0047** -0.0032* -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0095** -0.0065**
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0027)
Adj. R2 0.184 0.191 0.049 0.048 0.185 0.179
Model B
Tariﬀ × -0.0055** -0.0040** -0.0018 -0.0025† -0.0104** -0.0072**
Head’s ed.: none (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0028)
Tariﬀ × -0.0034** -0.0019 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0081** -0.0056*
Head’s ed.: primary (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Tariﬀ × -0.0006 0.0020 0.0012 0.0013 -0.0026 0.0029
Head’s ed.: secondary (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Tariﬀ × 0.0030* 0.0066** 0.0019 0.0014 0.0039 0.0117
Head’s ed.: higher (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0029)
Adj. R2 0.185 0.192 0.050 0.048 0.186 0.180
Model C
Tariﬀ 0.0022 0.0018 0.0015 0.0010 0.0030 0.0022
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0029) (0.0031)
Tariﬀ × -0.0059** -0.0043** -0.0021** -0.0019** -0.0107** -0.0075**
Rural (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0017) (0.0019)
Adj. R2 0.185 0.191 0.050 0.048 0.186 0.179
In all models:
District ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region×year interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr. obs. 235,393 223,013 122,834 114,731 112,559 108,282
Nr. districts 261 261 261 261 261 261
Notes: All models were estimated by OLS, weighted by sampling weights. Further controls
include age dummies, household size, and dummies on heads’ education, female head, and rural.
Robust standard errors (clustered at district level) are reported in parentheses. *,**,† denote
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Figure 11: Initial district sector composition and change in child work 1993-2002
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